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ABSTRACT 
This article analyzes the evolution of Spanish competitiveness and economic growth 
during the 19th and 20th century. After defining the concept of competitiveness in 
relation with other notions like productivity, economic growth, comparative 
advantage, or international competition, we apply this concept to the Spanish 
experience. The study includes the evolution of the Spanish Gross Domestic Product 
in terms of its convergence and divergence, the historical contribution of labor, 
capital, and total factor productivity on Spanish development, the institutional 
contributions to growth, and the evolution of competitiveness in Spanish regions, 
clusters and companies. Among other conclusions, the article emphasizes that, since 
1959, the progressive reduction of protectionism and intense public regulations, 
introduced at the end of the 19th century, allowed an intense economic growth and 
convergence process. But the Spanish economy still maintains some institutional 
shortcomings that reduce its potential future growth and affect its competitiveness 
and entrepreneurship. 
 
KEY WORDS: Competitiveness, economic growth, productivity, entrepreneurship, 
Spain 
 
JEL: N10, N20, O11, O43, O47. 
 
RESUMEN 
En este artículo se analiza la evolución de la competitividad y el crecimiento 
económico en España durante los siglos XIX y XX. Una vez definido el concepto de 
competitividad en relación con otras variables como la productividad, el crecimiento 
económico, la ventaja comparativa o la competencia internacional, aplicamos este 
concepto a la experiencia española. El estudio incluye la evolución del Producto 
Interior Bruto español en función de su convergencia o divergencia, la contribución 
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histórica del trabajo, el capital y la productividad total de los factores en el desarrollo 
español, las contribuciones del marco institucional, y la evolución de la 
competitividad en las regiones, clusters y empresas españolas. Entre otras 
conclusiones, el artículo destaca la progresiva reducción del proteccionismo y el 
intervencionismo económico desde 1959, políticas que habían sido introducidas a 
finales del siglo XIX, y cuya reforma y eliminación permitieron un intenso crecimiento 
económico y un proceso de convergencia. Pero la economía española todavía 
mantiene algunas deficiencias institucionales que reducen el potencial de 
crecimiento económico y afecta a la competitividad y el espíritu empresarial en 
España.  
 
PALABRAS CLAVE: Competitividad, crecimiento económico, productividad, 
emprendedores, España. 
 
INTRODUCTION: THE EVOLUTION OF COMPETITIVENESS 
CONCEPT 
 
Competitiveness is a widely used concept associated with other notions like 
productivity, economic growth, comparative advantage, or international competition. 
Although competitiveness is a relatively new concept in the early economic literature, 
its use is closely related with traditional economic discussions about the role of 
productivity and international competition in the economic growth of nations. Adam 
Smith (1776) developed two concepts that have paved the way to a greater 
understanding of the issue of competition. The first is the concept of income, defined 
as the value of all goods and services produced during a year in one economy. All 
economists accept this magnitude as the main measure of the wealth of nations. The 
second concept established by Adam Smith is the analytical framework of the causes 
that explain the growth of income. Smith proposed a production function where the 
increase of factors of production (land, labor and capital) will lead to economic 
growth. The factors’ increase could be either quantitative, by adding more land, 
workers or machines, though this quantitative addition has decreasing returns if 
some of the factors remain fixed, or qualitative, if each worker can produce more. 
Smith explained productivity growth through the division of labor; the specialization of 
workers and its productivity, produces a demand increase in the economy, which 
then encourages the division of labor, thus starting anew the virtuous circle process. 
The investment in new capital and the introduction of new technology will feed this 
process, assuming the existence of appropriate institutions protecting property rights 
and promoting free-trade inside and outside the country. 
 
This analytical framework has been maintained by almost all the economists, though 
each has maintained their own interpretations and has not placed equal weight on 
the different elements involved. Thus, the analysis of other classical economists, like 
Thomas Robert Malthus (1803) or David Ricardo (1817), was not as positive as 
Smith’s. Malthus considered that economic growth will increase wages and 
population growth, but the diminishing returns in agricultural production would limit 
this expansion with the increase of food prices. Ricardo developed Smith’s and 
Malthus’s arguments by considering that the increase of food prices would increase 
wage costs and reduce entrepreneur’s benefits, stopping the capital investment 
process and economic growth. Ricardo’s argument is based on the distribution of 
income, since the “unproductive” landlords will have benefits based on the food price 
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rises, but the “productive” capitalist’s entrepreneurs will reduce their potential 
investment growth due to increasing labor costs. Besides these and other arguments, 
all of the above mentioned authors considered that the short-run periods of economic 
growth could not go on indefinitely; in the long-run the economy will tend to be stable 
without economic growth, otherwise known as a “stationary” or “steady” state, as 
coined by John Stuart Mill (1848). 
 
The theoretical analysis of economic growth has maintained the last analytical 
framework, but has evolved because of two facts. The first is the introduction of 
income measurement, developed since the 1920’s with the national accounting 
systems. With this data, economists have been able to measure the evolution of 
nation’s economic growth, and the second element is that these empirical studies 
have shown some nations maintaining a sustainable economic growth during a long 
period of time1, while others not been able to develop any economic growth. After a 
period of lower interest in long-run economic growth (during the last decades of the 
19th century and the first half of the 20th century), the last two elements, together with 
the decolonization process which increased the importance of giving theoretical and 
practical solutions to economic growth problems that arose in newly independent 
nations, revitalized the economic growth literature after the Second World War. This 
literature firstly developed a mathematical framework to understand the economic 
growth process. After a failed attempt with the Harrod-Domar model2, the established 
and widely accepted growth model is the “Solow model” (Solow 1956 and 1957; 
Swan, 1956). The conclusion of the Solow model is the opposite of the Harrod-
Domar: investment in machinery is not the source of growth of per worker income in 
the long-run, but rather, the main source is technological change3. The nature of this 
conclusion derives from introducing to the model, besides the investment on new 
machines, the diminishing returns in the use of physical capital (with a Cobb-Douglas 
production function) and its depreciation. The simplest version of this model includes 
two factors of production, labor and capital, plus a third factor of technological 
change, also named “Total Factor Productivity” (TFT) as it measures the capacity of 
all factors to jointly increase the total productivity of the economy. 
 
One of the advantages of this model is its capacity to measure the economic growth 
of nations and the contribution of all the sources of growth involved in the production 
function4. This measurement, which we will apply to the Spanish economy later, 
shows that the TFT, not the investment in capital per worker, is the key source of 
long-run economic growth. However, TFT is not directly measured, but is the residual 
after introducing data of the rest of the variables (growth rates of per capita income 
and capital per worker), thus TFT could be nominated as the “measurement of our 
                                                           
1
 For example, the United States has had an average annual economic growth rate of 3.75 percent 
since 1790 to 2007 (Officer and Williamson, 2009). 
2
 In fact, this model was not intended as a growth model, but a debate on short-run business cycles in 
rich countries: the original articles (Harrod, 1939; Domar, 1946) were written in the aftermath of the 
Great Depression and took unemployment as given, so their main conclusion was that production is 
proportional to investment in physical capital, and labor does not play any role in production (this is 
based on the unrealistic assumption that the relative price of labor and capital is fixed and they are 
used in equal proportions). 
3
 Joseph Schumpeter (1942) could be considered a precedent in emphasizing the role of other factors 
than physical capital investment in long-run economic growth, factors like technology or 
entrepreneurship. 
4
 The contribution of capital and labor is weighted by their respective output–input elasticities. 
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ignorance” of the model. Besides, TFT has different interpretations. Originally, Solow 
considered this residual as the external and exogenous technological progress. 
Since then many other explanations have come up, including cost reduction or 
efficiency gains (Harberger, 1998), externalities and increasing returns (Romer, 
1986; Lucas, 1988), or policies favoring the adoption of new technologies (Parente 
and Prescott 1994; Prescott 1997). The potential of the Solow model is that it can 
include all these elements inside the model. Thus, some studies have introduced the 
incorporation of technology in the last capital invested, within a learning-by-doing 
process (Arrow, 1962; Gordon, 1990). Others have included human capital and 
technological generation in more complex models named “endogenous models” 
because the generation of new technology and ideas is a conscious process 
embedded in the production function, a process with more risk but higher returns due 
to the increasing returns of technology and ideas (Nelson and Phelps, 1966; Lucas, 
1988; Romer, 1990). 
 
Ample empirical literature has been developed around the growth models. Solow 
model predicts convergence because a greater investment of capital (or capital 
deepening) increases labor productivity, accordingly poorer countries with lower 
levels of capital per worker would have higher marginal productivity if capital were 
invested. An investment of capital can be either physical capital or human capital 
(Mankiw, Romer, and Weil, 1992), and its effectiveness is reinforced if openness 
facilitates the arrival of foreign savings into poorer countries (Barro, Mankiw, and 
Sala-i-Martin, 1995). The endogenous models, however, consider this convergence 
“conditional” because technology has two opposite effects in convergence. On the 
one hand, the technological differences between countries produce different “steady 
states”, so their economic growth, in the long-run, will tend towards different levels. 
On the other hand, poor countries can copy the technological advances and this 
technological catch-up reinforces convergence. Two more approaches appear to be 
related to empirical economic growth studies. The first approach uses the concept of 
“structural change” (Nurkse, 1953; Lewis, 1954) to study the increases in productivity 
based on wide factor movements in economic sectors. The movement of labor and 
capital from agricultural to industrial and services sectors will increase productivity 
and convergence, but the structural changes produced by new technologies, as it 
affects richer countries, will produce divergence at least in its first stages. The 
second approach analyzes the TFT differences and its contribution to economic 
growth. As convergence literature shows, divergence could appear when the 
institutional environment is not adequate for the development of free markets and for 
the investment in physical, human or technological capital. Private and public 
institutions have developed in recent years some methods to measure the positive or 
negative institutional contribution to growth, which in the first measurements were 
just the residual after introducing income, labor and capital data. This institutional 
framework includes not only internal but external factors, which focuses on the role of 
international trade and globalization allowing countries to take advantage of 
international factors (labor, capital, technology) and to increase the competitive 
environment inside their economies. Finally, we arrive at the concept of 
competitiveness. 
 
But, what is competitiveness? And how is it related to economic growth? In spite of 
its wide use, this concept has not been defined rigorously in the early economic 
literature. Some authors use the term in a similar way as comparative advantage, 
Pires, Luis. Historical analysis of spanish competitiveness in the european framework: 19
th
 
and 20
th
 centuries. 
Papeles de Europa 
22 (2011): 5-38 
9 
while others view it as an economy-wide characteristic. The concept of 
competitiveness as applied to one firm is clear: it is the capacity of the company to 
compete with other firms in the marketplace. Competition could arise by reducing the 
prices of their final product or by increasing their quality, by reducing the production 
factor costs or the financing costs, or by introducing technological and management 
improvements. To sum up, one firm is more competitive if it can improve its behavior 
in comparison with the rest of the firms in the industry. Achieving greater 
competitiveness will provide the firm with a larger market share, increasing its 
benefits and generating added value for the company owners and all of society. 
 
The simple extension of the micro concept of firm competitiveness to the macro level 
of competitiveness in the economy as a whole poses problems. These problems 
derive from the inaccuracy of studying one country as a homogeneous entity. Though 
one country has some common political and legal elements which affect all the 
agents that develop their economic activity inside its frontiers, every agent has 
different interests and incentives. Mistaken analyses of countries as a whole are 
usual in macroeconomics. For example, international trade authors tend to talk about 
trade between one country and another country, when the tradeoff is made by 
individual agents (firms or consumers), who are residents of different countries. The 
balance of payments is just the addition of all the individual tradeoffs made by 
residents of one country with the rest of the world. The same problem arises with the 
concepts of national savings or national investment, because one nation does not 
save or invest, but the individual agents do these economic actions based on 
individual and national incentives. We must be careful and balance the necessity of 
simplification of the economic science with the fallacy of composition which 
erroneously infers that something is true of the whole from the fact that it is true of 
some part of the whole. Paul Krugman (1994) has applied the last caveat to the 
concept of competitiveness. To consider a nation as a big corporation competing in 
the global marketplace is an obvious mistake. Countries, unlike corporations with 
unsustainable market position, do not go out of business. In fact, this vision of 
competitiveness is closely related with the protectionist view of international trade as 
a zero-sum game, where one country benefits at the cost of other nations. Within this 
vision, competitiveness is a world “win-lose” competition between the economies. 
Diametrically opposed to this idea, the classical theories consider that international 
trade benefits both parts (Ricardo, 1817), which not only applies at the micro level in 
the case of two agents which voluntarily tradeoff, but at the macro level where two 
whole countries trade and each can obtain cheaper goods and services from abroad, 
and can also allocate their domestic production factors to sectors where the countries 
have comparative advantages. The “comparative advantage” concept does not affect 
competition between countries, but competition between firms within a country to get 
the best (cheaper) factors for their production. Imports are then an indirect method of 
production or a kind of technology which allows a more efficient allocation of scarce 
resources, because it forces the firms to only focus on the use the resources in the 
sectors where the country has a comparative advantage. 
 
A less radical vision of competitiveness would relate the favorable trade performance 
of one economy with its general economic growth process. Thus, trade performance 
could be measured in different ways: export and import volumes in terms of GDP, 
trade deficits, the level of exchange rate, or the terms of trade. However, the use of 
these measures presents some problems. The first measure, foreign trade volume is 
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related to economic growth when foreign trade volume is a reflection of the openness 
or protectionism of one country. For example, we will see that the openness of the 
Spanish economy since 1959 was a key factor in its development and convergence 
process in the following decades. But when the economy is opened to the 
international markets, the degree of openness is based on other factors not directly 
related with economic performance, for example the size of the country and its 
degree of specialization (as well as that of their neighbors’). We should also take into 
account that economic borders are not as clearly delineated as political ones, for 
example, the foreign trade of Belgium is different in theory than the trade between 
two states in the United States or two regions of China. The second measure, trade 
deficit or surplus, cannot be a direct reflection of economic achievement. In the first 
instance, the deficit could be sustaining productive investments with future potential 
growth. In a second instance, the trade deficit is used to import final goods and 
services, though is not a productive investment and will increase national debts, 
meanwhile the population is enjoying higher levels of consumption and income. The 
last contradictions also affect the third measure, the level of exchange rate. This level 
reflects the long-run evolution of one country and the purchasing power of their 
citizens, though sometimes there are some intrinsic measurement problems when 
the exchange rate is fixed or is controlled by the government. Besides, if one country 
devaluates its currency to reduce its trade deficit, a positive effect (reducing trade 
deficit) coincides with a negative one (reducing the citizens’ wealth by lowering their 
purchasing power). Finally, terms of trade can also pose problems if used as a proxy 
for the relative social welfare of a country, because it doesn’t show the volume of the 
countries' exports, only relative changes between countries are apparent. To 
summarize, the connections between trade variables and economic performance are 
very complex, and a complete analysis must be carried out introducing other 
variables like the volume of trade, changes in productivity and resource allocation, or 
changes in capital flows. 
 
Michael E. Porter (1990) has developed the study of trade performance through the 
concept of “competitive advantage”, clearly opposed to the traditional “comparative 
advantage”. Porter’s study is inductive or empirical, as it detects the most competitive 
national sectors or firms, meaning those who are able to export, and then analyzes 
the domestic factors to explain their specific competitive success. These factors 
could be reduced to four broad attributes that make up the “diamond of national 
competitive advantage”: factors of production, domestic demand, related and 
supported industries, and firm strategy, structure and rivalry. Porter introduces 
management analysis in his study, and some authors criticize the fallacy of 
composition that derives from considering national competitiveness just the simple 
addition of successful firms and sectors competitiveness. But one of the main 
contributions of Porter is to put competitiveness in relation to domestic economic 
attributes. Competitive success is a reflection of the good domestic behavior of one 
economy: “the only meaningful concept of competitiveness at the national level is 
national productivity” (Porter, 1990: 6). 
 
This idea has become the guiding principle of many studies on national economic 
success. See, for example, the next definition made by the World Economic Forum in 
his last Report on Global Competitiveness: “We define competitiveness as the set of 
institutions, policies, and factors that determine the level of productivity of a country. 
The level of productivity, in turn, sets the sustainable level of prosperity that can be 
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earned by an economy. In other words, more competitive economies tend to be able 
to produce higher levels of income for their citizens” (Schwab, 2009: 4). A similar 
definition is made by the European Competitiveness Report published annually by 
the European Commission: “Competitiveness refers to the overall economic 
performance of a nation measured in terms of its ability to provide its citizens with 
growing living standards on a sustainable basis and broad access to jobs for those 
willing to work. In short, competitiveness refers to the institutional and policy 
arrangements that create the conditions under which productivity can grow 
sustainably (productivity growth is the only source of sustained income growth, in 
turn the backbone of growing living standards)” (European Commission, 2010: 22). 
With these definitions we are again at the starting point in the analysis of the wealth 
of nations: the goal of increasing citizens’ income could be achieved with a 
combination of different factors, and competitiveness is just the allocation of these 
factors within a country. One country is more competitive if it has more factors that 
increase its ability to sustain its level of income and its potential to growth in the 
future. Which are these factors? Every study emphasizes one or another, though 
they all cover similar areas already analyzed: factors of production, technology, 
globalization, and institutional framework. 
 
For example, the competitiveness report previously mentioned considers 12 
components or “pillars of competitiveness”, divided in three phases of economic 
development based on countries’ GDP per capita and the share of exports 
comprising primary goods. Institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic stability, and 
health and primary education, are the fourth first pillars, belonging to the first stage of 
countries, the “factor-driven” economies based on primarily unskilled labor, low 
wages and natural resources. Higher education and training, goods market 
efficiency, labor market efficiency, financial market sophistication, technological 
readiness, and market size, belong to the second stage of “efficiency-driven” 
economies, with higher wages, more efficient production processes and increase 
product quality. Finally, the last two pillars, business sophistication, and innovation, 
are important for most developed economies in the “innovation-driven” stage, where 
competition with new and unique products are the only way to sustain higher 
standard of living (Schwab, 2009: 4-8). One of the problems of all these factors is the 
different difficulty to measure them. Some variables, like GDP, productivity, or 
macroeconomic stability, are easier to measure than others. In fact, the advances in 
economic growth theories and the concept of competitiveness are closely related 
with the advances in the capacity to measure new growth elements like institutions or 
entrepreneurship. 
 
Thus, the analysis of the Spanish economic growth and competitiveness will take into 
account all these elements. Next section will study the Spanish GDP evolution in 
terms of its convergence and divergence during the last two centuries. Section three 
will focus on the analysis of total factor productivity (TFP), by analyzing the historical 
contribution of labor, capital, and TFP in the Spanish development. In last years, 
private and public institutions have developed some methods to measure the positive 
or negative institutional contributions to growth, and we will review this approach for 
the Spanish case in section four. Section five will focus on the evolution of the 
Spanish regions, clusters and companies competitiveness. We are going to make a 
historical analysis of the Spanish economic growth and competitiveness because the 
analysis of competitiveness applied to one country includes its long-run economic 
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growth and its potential to maintain this growth in the future, and because growth is 
an accumulative process where what happened in the past has an influence in what 
is happening now and what is going to happen in the future. So the article concludes 
with the main elements of the Spanish economic growth and competitiveness 
evolution, and their influence in the Spanish potential development. 
 
1. A LONG-RUN ANALYSIS OF COMPETITIVENESS AND 
CONVERGENCE IN SPAIN 
 
The modernization of the Spanish economy has been produced during the last two 
centuries, 19th and 20th centuries, and with more intensity during the second half of 
the 20th century. The study of the elements that reinforced or reduced economic 
growth during this Contemporary History period can explain the current situation of 
the Spanish economy with its potentialities and weakness. Although past situations 
not always can be repeated in the present, the knowledge of the elements that 
reduced or reinforced Spanish competitiveness in the past can be used to improve 
the Spanish economy in the future. We have chosen the Contemporary History 
period because is in this period when the Spanish economy have converged to the 
richest central Europe, within a process that started with the Industrial Revolution at 
the end of the 18th century and culminated with the entry of Spain in the European 
Union at the end of the 20th century. 
 
Angus Maddison’ recompilation of national macroeconomic data allows us to have 
the Spanish per capita Gross Domestic Product series since 1850 (Maddison, 2010). 
Though there are some individual data in 1820, 1700, 1600 and 1500, their quality is 
lower than the series starting in 1850. However, some historians, with the 
construction of new measures of agricultural and aggregate output, have made long-
run conjectural and comparative estimates of the Spanish economy’ evolution since it 
was born as a nation in 1492. Economic growth in the 16th century coincided with the 
imperial expansion period, but the subsequent decadence produced contraction and 
stagnation in the 17th and 18th centuries. In the long run, output per head did not 
improve until the second half of the 19th century. At the time of its imperial expansion 
Spain was a relatively affluent nation and, by 1590, was only behind the Low 
Countries and Italy in terms of per capita income. Spain's decline has its roots in the 
17th century while its backwardness deepened in the first half of the 19th century 
(Álvarez-Nogal and Prados, 2008). 
 
In the first decades of the 19th century the Spanish income reduced due to some 
negative experiences: the Napoleonic occupation of Spain and the liberalization war, 
the loss of the American colonies, the political instability of the Fernando VII 
kingdom, unable to overcome the political divide or to create stable institutions, and 
the Carlist Civil Wars which started with the death of Fernando VII in 1833 and his 
change in the order of dynastic succession. In spite of these negative facts, this 
period represents the change from the Ancient Regime through a modern economy 
and society. As a matter of fact, the three Carlist Wars (1833-40, 1847-49, and 1872-
76) have been considered a fight between traditionalism, Catholicism, monarchism, 
and regionalism against liberalism and modernism. Some authors even consider the 
Spanish Civil War of the 20th century (1936-39) a continuation of the Carlist Wars, 
only overcame with the democracy at the end of the century. In the first half of the 
19th century, overall after 1833, some liberal reforms were made: the ecclesiastical 
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1500-1600 0.26
1600-1700 0.00
1700-1820 0.20
1820-1850 0.23
1850-2007 1.86
1850-1929 1.19
1850-1960 0.96
1929-1939 -3.52
1939-1950 1.22
1951-1960 2.84
1960-2007 4.02
1960-1974 7.22
1975-1986 1.66
1987-1991 4.04
1992-1996 1.46
1997-2007 3.66
confiscations, the abolition of the Mesta (a powerful association of sheep holders 
born in the medieval era), the end of the guilds, and the elimination of tariffs and local 
restrictions on domestic trade. These reforms laid a firm political foundation for the 
economic integration of Spain, the free mobility of labor and capital, and were the 
base for economic growth in the second half of the century (Tedde de Lorca, 1994). 
Nevertheless, other authors consider that these institutional changes were not 
intense enough in some aspects like justice administration, the reform of the state, or 
the establishment of property rights. This lack of modernization of the institutional 
framework could explain the Spanish backwardness. 
 
Table 1. Spanish per capita GDP annual growth rates (percentages) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Maddison 2010 
 
 
The period that started in 1850 clearly stands out compared to the previous 
centuries, in which the annual growth rates were around zero (in the 17th century) to 
0.3 percent (table 1). Next figure uses the logarithm scale to distinguish growth rates, 
and shows three periods, 1850-1930, with a growth close to 1 percent, the crisis 
period of 1930-1960, and 1960 to 2007 with an extraordinary annual growth rate of 4 
percent. 
 
The data compiled by Angus Maddison allow us to make a comparative analysis of 
the Spanish economic growth. The spreading of the Industrial Revolution affected 
different countries at different moments. It firstly influenced the central European 
countries (France, Belgium, Switzerland), and later was diffused to other “late 
comers” like the United States, Germany, Russia, and Japan; but other peripheral 
countries, like Spain, Portugal, Italy, Ireland, and Greece, could not take full 
advantage of the First Industrial Revolution and only could converge to rich European 
countries after the Second Industrial Revolution in the 20th century. The first Spanish 
historians have compared the Spanish evolution in the 19th century with the United 
Kingdom, and their main conclusion is that the spreading of the First Industrial 
Revolution in Spain was a “failure” (Nadal, 1975). But this comparison is not 
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appropriate, being better to compare Spain with other nations with similar institutional 
characteristics. Figure 2 represents this comparison.  
 
Figure 1. Spanish GDP per capita in logarithm scale (1850-2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Maddison 2010 
 
 
Figure 2. GDP per capita of Spain, Italy and Portugal, compared to the most advanced 
countries (1850-2007) 
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Source: Maddison 2010 
 
 
The evolution of these peripheral countries (Spain, Italy and Portugal) fits with the 
three phases of the Spanish economy shown in figure 1. In the first period (19th 
century and the first third of the 20th century) the moderate economic growth of these 
countries (1 percent in Spain) allowed them to maintain the distance with the 
advanced countries or even to slightly diverge with them. In this period, Spanish and 
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Italian income was 60 percent of most advanced countries, while Portugal was 40 
percent. After the crisis in the 1930’s and 1940’s decades, these and other peripheral 
countries experienced an intense economic growth process, which allowed them to 
converge with the most advanced countries. Spain, which was close to Italy in the 
19th century, moved away and increased its relative distance to advanced countries 
until being close to Portugal in the 1940’s. But the subsequent intense convergence 
allowed Spain to catch-up the Italian level in 2007. Figure 3 shows the convergence 
process in the second half of the 20th century including another two countries, 
Greece and Ireland. The common convergence process of these backward European 
countries shows differences, with the spectacular behavior of Ireland or the relative 
slowdown of Italy since 1980. 
 
Figure 3. GDP per capita of Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece and Ireland, compared to the 
most advanced countries (1945-2007) 
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Notes: Most advanced countries = France + Germany + United Kingdom + United States = 100 
Source: Maddison 2010 
 
 
In the next paragraphs we will make a more detailed analysis of the short-run 
periods, to highlight the main economic, social, and political characteristics of the 
Spanish economic development. The first period is 1850-1891. After the political 
instability of the first half of the century, this phase was more stable, with only an 
instable period in 1868-1874 with the revolutionary years and the First Republic. 
Economic growth was intense in comparison with the previous decades, but similar 
to the rest of Europe, so there was not convergence either divergence in spite of our 
backwardness. The growth was more intense since 1880, and the main explanation 
is the foreign investment. This investment came mainly from French and British 
capitals, and was used in railway networks and coal mines. The inflow of capital 
allowed the rate of investment to rise, breaking the link between investment and 
domestic saving, which contribute to more rapid growth. Furthermore, the 
investments promoted the introduction of new technologies, both directly 
incorporated in the capital or indirectly with management improvements. Together 
with these positive elements derived from foreign investments, other institutional 
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changes promoted economic growth in the second half of the 19th century. Thus, the 
national transportation and communications system strengthened as railway 
networks were completed and telegraph mileage increased exponentially (Sánchez-
Albornoz, 1975; Gómez Mendoza, 1982). The development of Spain’s telegraph 
network, together with some profound changes in the financial system, facilitated the 
integrating of the national capital market. Among these changes stand out two: a new 
legal framework allowing the establishment of private banks with the right of issuing 
banknotes in 1842, and the creation of a Central Bank in 1874, the “Banco de 
España”, which became the sole issuing bank and established the first nationwide 
branch network allowing movements of capital across towns at constant and cheap 
rates (Castañeda and Tafunell, 1993). Finally, regional migrations rose appreciably 
during the second half of the century, mainly from the countryside to the cities, 
showing a trend similar to that of other countries in Southern Europe (Pérez Moreda, 
1987; Silvestre, 2002). 
 
In 1891, a protectionist tariff was introduced in Spain. Though this policy was made 
within the context of the turn-over of protectionism in which most countries 
participated since the 1870’s and the First World War, in Spain it opened a long 
period of protectionism and public regulation that only finished at the end of the 20th 
century. Spanish protection was high in comparative terms, and biased to 
manufactures, a protectionist model which has influenced negatively the long trend 
manufacture competitiveness. Although the most common interpretation of the 
backwardness of the Spanish industrialization is based on the agricultural low 
productivity and the scarcity of the domestic demand for industrial products (Nadal, 
1975), the most significant singularity of the Spanish industrial process was its low 
capacity to export manufactures to the international market and not the failure of 
domestic demand (Tena, 2010). Other explanations of the Spanish backwardness 
and weak industrialization, like differences in geographical, capital and human-capital 
factor endowment levels of departure (Tortella, 1994) are complement with the 
relevant changes in the industrial comparative advantage produced by the 
commercial policy in Spain. The comparison of the Italian and Spanish trade policies 
confirms that the consequence of protection on competitiveness was negative, more 
robust and consistent in Spain because it was the economy that experiences a 
higher manufacture tariff increase during this period. Italian economy grew faster 
than its Spanish counterpart at the turn of the century Giolittian period of expansion 
of the international economy, while Spanish economy performed better during the 
1920´s in a less expansive international context (see figure 2). The existence of 
significant different protection policies in Spain and Italy explains the different 
industrial structure and competitiveness performance of both economies (Tena, 
2010). 
 
The protection policy change in 1891 can be also analyzed in terms of Balance of 
Payments and investment. The economic expansion of the previous period (1850-
1890) coincided with a significant current account deficit, whereas in 1891-1913, 
economic growth slowed down at the time of positive current account balances. This 
inverse correlation between current account surplus and economic growth suggests 
that the balance of payments reacted to changes in the equilibrium between saving 
and investment. The current account deficit before 1891 resulted from an inflow of 
capital that allowed the rate of investment to rise and, in turn, to contribute to more 
rapid growth. Only when isolation from the international economy increased, since 
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1891, investment demand had to rely on domestic saving. In the context of 
globalization that characterized the classical gold standard era, there was no reason 
why an open economy should not enjoy sustained access to international capital 
markets and break the link between investment and domestic saving. At the turn of 
the century, domestic macroeconomic imperfections strengthened the current 
account reversals that had been provoked by sudden stops, undermining the 
confidence of foreign investors in the Spanish economy and helping the flight of 
foreign capital. Furthermore, the migration push of the 1891 protectionist tariff was 
largely offset by the microeconomic consequences of the currency crash preventing 
individuals from migrating for one and a half decades (Prados, 2010). 
 
Last paragraphs emphasize the idea that potential growth of the Spanish economy 
was missed in the first half of the 20th century. This does not mean that Spain did not 
growth and converge in this period. The independence of the last Spanish colonies in 
1898 (Cuba, Puerto Rico and Philippines) allowed the return of national capital 
invested in the colonies. The protectionism stimulated some industrial sectors, 
though at the spent of others, and some firms took advantage of the Second 
Industrial Revolution and the Spanish neutrality in the First World War to develop 
some investments, for example with the electrification process in the 1920’s (which 
continued later in the 1950’s). But the Spanish economy could have grown more, 
because it did not take full advantage of its potential. The main causes of this 
situation were the political policies of protectionism and regulation supporting private 
interests. In fact, the loss of the last colonies in 1898 had an important influence in 
this situation because it produced a combination of fiscal disorder and monetary 
expansion to finance the colonial war. The effect on the Spanish macroeconomic 
instability, increasing inflation and public deficit, produced an exchange rate 
instability and isolation from foreign flows inwards in the Spanish economy. The 
colonial market independence caused adverse effects because of the institutional 
changes brought about in Spain, mainly by reinforcing the already present nationalist 
inward looking strategic in manufacture industry (Fraile and Escribano, 1998). The 
protection policies were more related with the political economy of pressure groups 
than with the identification of potential export activities by governments, encouraging 
more rent seeking than a reduction cost process as an easy way to increase profits. 
Thus, the Spanish industrialization in the most part of the 20th century was based on 
an economic policy based on protectionism and support of some pressure groups, 
which reduced the potential growth of the nation (Fraile, 1991). 
 
The Great Depression had a relatively mild impact in the Spanish economy, but the 
1930’s, with the Second Republic (1931-1936), was a period of political and 
economic instability. Expectations after the collapse of the monarchy were not 
fulfilled, as proposals for land reform, industrial relations legislation and welfare 
improvements were not completed or enforced, leading to social unrest, extremely 
political violence, and a military coup d’état. The subsequent Civil War (1936-39) 
could be seen as a distributional conflict resulting from the social and political 
tensions of the rapid growth period of the 1920’s (Prados and Sanz, 1996). The 
impact of the Civil War affected the physical capital, though it was damaged less than 
other European countries after the Second World War, and the human capital, more 
affected due to postwar exile and internal repression. But the main damage was 
made in institutions. During almost four decades Spain had an authoritarian regime 
based upon a limited pluralism of political groups around the dictator, General 
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Francisco Franco. The economic policies of the Franco regime affected the economic 
performance of Spain, though these policies evolved during all this period. In the first 
years, the uncertainty about the viability of the regime led Franco to give priority to 
immediate political stability over any other competing goal. The ideology of most of 
the groups supporting the Franco government and its rhetoric was also anti-market 
and pro-protectionism and state interventionism (Fraile, 1998). 
 
The autarkic model of development introduced by the Franco dictatorship was based 
in the next elements. Firstly, a protectionism policy which aimed at import 
substitution, using two basic tools: quantitative restrictions and exchange controls. 
The second major feature of Spanish autarky was a systematic policy of government 
intervention and regulation of the economy, where the state controlled every step in 
economic activity through a licensing system for starting and enlarging industries. 
The authorities also regulated prices for commodities considered vital for 
industrialization, and controlled the evolution of nominal wages in the labor market. 
Another strategic instrument for government intervention was the “Instituto Nacional 
de Industria”, which organized and directed public investment in the first two decades 
of the dictatorship. Finally, Franco’s government maintained a pre-Keynesian fiscal 
policy of balance budget and the control of public expenditure. This set of policies led 
to a highly overvalued currency, a current account deficit, low reserves of hard 
currency, inflation derived from a constant disequilibrium between supply and 
demand caused by the price regulation, and a small and inefficient industrial sector 
(Prados and Sanz, 1996). This strong constraint provided, in turn, an especially 
advantageous position to those already powerful small groups and coalitions which, 
in exchange for support to the dictatorship, would derive rents from the public sector 
and even control the state's economic decisions (Fraile, 1999). Though these policies 
had been present in the Spanish economy since the end of the 19th century, in the 
autarky period its application was extremely intense and, more important, in the first 
decades of the century Spain followed the protectionism and interventionism of the 
rest of countries (with a little more intensity), while in the autarky years Spain 
deviated from the opening trend of European countries to open and deregulate their 
economies. Figures 2 and 3 show that while other periphery countries started their 
convergence after the Second World War, mainly Italy which had the same economic 
characteristics of Spain, the dictatorships of Spain and Portugal could not take 
advantage of convergence until 1960. 
 
In the 1950’s the Spanish income grew faster together with a significant 
transformation in productive structure. Some of the more extreme autarky policies 
were relaxed, but not suppressed, while the regime became more stable and the 
international isolation began to breakdown due to the Cold War and its progressive 
integration in the international political framework, like the military agreements with 
the United States, the agreements with the Vatican, and the entry in the UN (Prados 
and Sanz, 1996). In the late 1950s, clear signs of economic over-heating manifested 
in growing inflation and increasing external deficit. Foreign exchange reserves, in 
particular, were exhausted by mid-1959. In such circumstances, a complete 
economic policy reorientation represented by the “Stabilization and Liberalization 
Plan” in 1959 was forced in order to prevent the collapse of the economy. Spain 
opened up to major international organizations and committed to gradual 
liberalization. The 1959 Stabilization Plan marked the beginning of a new era in the 
Spanish economy since the country entered rapidly into a process of economic 
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liberalization and international market integration. By implementing the new policy, 
Franco’s regime showed its commitment to orthodox macroeconomic policies and 
offered a precedent of responsible behavior to domestic and foreign investors 
(Prados, Roses, and Sanz, 2010). 
 
The oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 coincided with the end of Franco's regime and the 
transition to democracy. Structural inefficiencies were inherited from the Franco era, 
and the post-1959 liberalization had been progressively curtailed by the pressure of 
interest groups, resulting in a mixture of market and interventionism economy, whose 
negative effects would emerge with the supply shocks of the 1970s with 
disinvestment, inflation, and job destruction. Only after the establishment of 
democracy in 1977 adjustment measures were introduced with the “Moncloa 
Agreements”, a set of structural reforms and economic policy measures supported by 
the consensus of the main political parties. Among its main features are the fiscal 
reform, in which progressive wealth and income taxes were included, an active 
monetary policy aimed at reducing inflation expectations followed, a new exchange 
rate for the peseta in an attempt to improve the external disequilibrium, a trade 
liberalization, though it was not fully developed until the entry in the European Union 
in 1986, and finally an income policy attempted to moderate increases in nominal 
wages. All these measures could control, in the short-run, the macroeconomic 
imbalances of inflation and external deficit, and opened a long-run period of 
economic adjustments and reforms to remove the anti-market policies from the 
Franco era (Prados and Sanz, 1996). 
 
The crisis lasted until 1986, coinciding with the entry in the European Union and with 
an expansionary phase of the international economy. The socialist governments 
(1981-1996) emphasized the control of inflation with high interest rates, increase of 
government debt, currency devaluation, and wage restraint. The intense economic 
growth of 4 percent hid other macroeconomic problems, mainly the difficulty to create 
new jobs. The labor market legislation was a legacy of the dictatorship, and the 
democratic governments, up to now, have not been able to derogate this rigid 
system. They only have introduced flexible contracts for new workers, which 
produced a duality in the Spanish labor markets, with privileged workers with stable 
contracts coexisting with precarious workers (mainly young people, women and 
immigrants) with flexible contracts. On the other hand, high real interest rates 
discouraged entrepreneurs’ investment. The entry in the EU increased foreign 
investment and modernization of the Spanish firms with the foreign competition. 
From 1987 to 1991 the government also gave a boost to public investment in 
infrastructures. 
 
A new crisis affected Spain in 1992. The political policies of the 1980’s appreciated 
the peseta (around 15 percent) and produced a trade deficit. The international 
markets were afraid that Spain could not maintain the exchange of the peseta fixed in 
the European Monetary System signed in the Maastricht Treaty, and speculated 
against this and other European currencies (United Kingdom, Italy). Spain 
devaluated the peseta 40 percent. The economic crisis increased unemployment rate 
up to 20 percent and showed the collapse of the economic policies of the 1980’s. A 
new government in 1996 changed the economic policy and introduced orthodox fiscal 
policies (public deficit and public debt controls), low interest rates, control of inflation 
by means of structural reforms in production and factor markets, and the introduction 
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of higher competition. Spain could get into the Euro in 1999 achieving all the criteria 
of the “Stability and Growth Pact”, and opened a new expansion period of ten years 
(1997-2007). The Spanish economy could avoid the crisis of 2001 and had very high 
growth rates in this period (with an average of 3.7 percent). The unemployment rate 
was reduced to 7.8 percent in 2007 together with the entry of 5 million immigrants, 
which stimulated the Spanish economy, while the Spanish firms started to invest in 
foreign markets. Shortcomings of this period are the inflation difference with the EU 
(close to 15 percent accumulated since the last devaluation of the peseta in 1995), 
which has increased the trade deficit, and the unbalanced development of the 
construction and banking sectors, stimulated by lower interest rates and a real estate 
price bubble that abruptly ended the expansion period with the world financial crisis 
of 2007. This crisis has emerged some Spanish economic problems that apparently 
were resolved, like the unemployment (again in rate levels greater than 20 percent 
nowadays), the public deficit and debt (produced by the lack of controls in the 
expenditure of central and regional governments), and the critical situation of the 
Spanish banks. 
 
Once we have studied the periods of the Spanish economic evolution, in the rest of 
the article we will focus on specific analysis of Spanish competitiveness, starting with 
the contribution of labor, capital, and total factor productivity, then focusing on the 
Spanish institutional framework, and finally studying the evolution of Spanish 
competitiveness in its regions, clusters and companies. 
 
2. THE EVOLUTION OF FACTORS OF PRODUCTION AND 
PRODUCTIVITY IN SPAIN 
 
The first approach to the evolution of Spanish competitiveness is the analysis of the 
factors of production and its contribution to income growth. The per capita Gross 
Domestic Product since 1850 has been completed with the measurement of physical 
and human capital for the period 1850-2000 by two economic historians, Leandro 
Prados de la Escosura and Joan Rosés (2009, 2010a, and 2010b). 
 
Starting with physical capital, its stock grew, on average, 3.5 percent per year, while 
per capita GDP only grew 1.8 percent. Different phases can be distinguished in the 
evolution of the capital growth. A first intense expansion between 1850’s and 1880’s 
was based on institutional reforms, the opening up to foreign capital and the 
international trade. As explained before, inflows of foreign capital made it possible to 
break the close connection between investment and savings and contributed to 
economic growth. The foreign investment was concentrated in railroads and mines, 
increasing the capital stock. The institutional stability of the period also contributed to 
the favorable environment for investment and growth. This first period of expansion 
was followed by a slowdown until World War I, when macroeconomic instability and 
protectionism policies led to a reduction of foreign investment. Physical capital grew 
briskly during the 1920’s, based mainly in electrification. Some historians have 
assumed that state intervention through external protection and regulation, together 
with investments in public infrastructure made a decisive contribution to capital 
accumulation and to growth (Velarde, 1968). But other authors assume that 
government intervention led to resource misallocation because it did not take into 
account its opportunity cost (Comín, 1987), the increasing power of oligopolies 
reduced incentives for technological change (Fraile, 1991), and the expansion of 
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public spending (through the increase in money supply and government debt) fuelled 
inflation and increased currency volatility (Comín and Martin, 1984, Palafox, 1991). 
The capital expansion was cut short in the early 1930’s, representing a fracture in the 
intense capital stock expansion of the previous decade. This slowdown remained 
sluggish until 1950, due to capital destruction in the Spanish Civil War and the slow 
recovery in Spain compared with other western European economies affected by the 
Second World War.   
 
The most intense expansion of capital happened during the Golden Age, 1959-1974. 
In the 1950’s, the volatility of import capacity rendered investment risky and tended to 
penalize capital accumulation, while inflows of foreign capital and new technology 
were restricted. The change introduced by the Stabilization Plan in 1959 removed the 
obstacles to increase the stock of capital. The adoption of mass production 
techniques from abroad and the diffusion of road transport appear crucial for this 
accelerated capital accumulation. In the last quarter of the 20th century, the capital 
growth rate reduced but was higher than in the pre-1950 period. The first years 
(1975-1986) were marked by the transition to democracy and the reorganization of 
Spanish economy as capital equipment, largely obsolete and energy-intensive, 
needed to be replaced. Since 1986 European funds largely contributed to the 
construction of new infrastructures and the renewal of public transport equipment. 
 
The long-run contribution of physical capital to Spanish economic growth has been 
based in two factors. The first one is the deep change in the composition of capital 
stock produced during all this period. The change consisted on the steady decline in 
the weight of residential capital and the increasing contribution of infrastructure and 
equipment, which increased the service provided by capital stock to production and 
its quality. The second factor is the capital intensity, which relates the amount of 
capital to other factors of production, especially labor. The use of capital makes labor 
more effective, pushing up its productivity. The process of capital deepening took 
place over the last two centuries, with more intensity during the second half of the 
20th century. But the capital-output ratio has decreased during the periods where 
growth of GDP was fastest (1920’s and overall 1950-1974), showing a significant 
contribution of total factor productivity to Spanish economic growth over these years. 
The comparison with other developed countries shows that capital deepening did not 
increase particularly fast in Spain, especially in the 1950’s in spite of starting from a 
lower level of capital, due to problems related with low human capital endowment 
and resource misallocation in an over-regulated autarchy economy. Inversely, after 
the liberalization of 1959, capital productivity grew in Spain while declined in Western 
Europe and Japan. Once the Golden Age was over, accelerated capital deepening 
was met again by declining capital efficiency in Spain (Prados and Rosés, 2010a). 
 
Human capital accumulation can also contribute to economic growth, though its 
measure is more complicated than physical capital. The traditional measure includes 
education, where Spain has had backwardness and lower growth rates since 1950. 
Human capital accumulation rates even decreased from 1921 to 1952, with very low 
rates in high-school education. Since the 1960s, however, education accelerated 
significantly (Núñez, 1992). But education is not the only way to measure human 
capital contribution to economic growth, as it does not consider the different ways in 
which people enhance their capabilities. The level of education is now very high in 
Spain, and the level of university education is even one of the highest in the world, 
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but most of the studies agreed that the quality of education in Spain is very low and 
represents an obstacle in the modernization of the Spanish economy (for example 
the PISA reports). In fact, with per capita income growth, population invests more on 
education, but not all education is employed in the production-side of the economy, 
because part of it becomes a consumption service. The analysis of a broad human 
capital including its quantity and its quality, and the comparison of its contribution to 
economic growth with physical capital and total factor productivity, reflects that 
human capital contributed less than these other factors. But, although human capital 
contributed little to the increase in labor productivity growth, its accumulation had 
facilitated technological innovation. In particular, the increase in human capital during 
the Golden Age correlates well with the spectacular rise in TFP growth rates, which 
was facilitated by the massive adoption of foreign technologies (Prados and Rosés, 
2010b). 
 
Once we have studied the individual contribution of both factors of production, capital 
and labor, to the Spanish long-run economic growth, the next step is to do a joint 
analysis of all the elements: capital and labor accumulation, and efficiency gains or 
total factor productivity (TFT). In the last two centuries, TFP was equally responsible 
for GDP growth than broad physical capital and, to less extent, human capital. While 
in the period 1850-1950 the moderate growth was dominated by factor accumulation, 
the fast growth in the second half of the 20th century was led by total factor 
productivity. However, TFP played an important role in phases of faster GDP growth 
prior to 1950, mainly in 1850-1883 and the 1920’s. Furthermore, the importance of 
TFP as a source of growth tends to be underestimated as it does not include the 
additional capital accumulation that results from a productivity increase. The 
introduction of the railroads and the modern exploitation of Spanish mining ore 
deposits during the second half of the 19th century, and the electrification in the 
1920’s, have produced efficiency gains and higher capital intensity resulting from the 
new capital goods. Total factor productivity led GDP growth during the Golden Age, 
but also did it during the crisis period of 1974-1986, when efficiency gains prevented 
a GDP contraction, as the increase in broad capital fell short to compensate the 
dramatic decline in employment. This productivity increase was associated to 
industrial re-structuring and shifts of resources away from agriculture and traditional 
industrial sectors. Since Spain’s entry into the European Union (1986) employment 
creation and the recovery of physical capital accumulation offset the slowdown in 
total factor productivity, following the same evolution than the rest of Europe. This 
productivity slowdown has been compensated by a strong increase in hours worked. 
 
Since the mid-1970s, Spain (and Europe) seems to have been unable to combine 
employment and productivity growth. In the long-run, factor accumulation, especially 
capital, and TFP growth seem to have been complementary for GDP and labor 
productivity growth. Spanish experience suggests a two-stage process in which 
improving efficiency appears as a complex learning process that takes place once 
growth has been initiated on the basis of allocating additional capital and labor to 
production. Factor accumulation prevailed over efficiency gains in the early stages of 
Spanish development, but it played a role during the transitional phase to long-run 
growth, and once economic growth is under way, TFP tends to perform a more 
significant part, showing that the ability to absorb and to adapt productively foreign 
ideas and technology depend on a country’s development level (Prados and Rosés, 
2009). 
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To sum up, the convergence of the Spanish economy in the second half of the 20th 
century was based on institutional and political changes that can be reflected in four 
dates: 1959 with the “Stabilization Plan” and its change in the protectionist and 
interventionist policies applied since the beginning of the century, 1977 with the 
political transition and “Moncloa Agreements” which continued the reforms of the 
“Stabilization Plan”, 1986 with the entry in the European Union, and 1999 with the 
entry in the Monetary Union and the Euro, both last dates representing our definitive 
integration in the global markets. Economic crisis have also a role in this evolution. 
The Spanish institutional shortcomings are one of the main causes that explains that 
economic crisis tend to be more intense in Spain. For example, the 1970’s crisis 
reflected the structural inefficiencies inherited from the Franco era with a mixture of 
market and interventionism economy, while the 1992 crisis reflected the 
macroeconomic problems and the wrong economic policies of the 1980’s. But the 
economic crises have been also a challenge to correct and reform the Spanish 
institutional problems. Thus, the Stabilization Plan in 1959 was implemented after an 
intense crisis, Spain adopted the Moncloa Agreements and entry in the European 
Union after the 1970’s crisis, while the 1992 crisis preceded the entry in the Monetary 
Union after achieving the macroeconomic Maastricht criteria. The current economic 
crisis is showing some Spanish institutional shortcomings that must be reformed. 
This is the goal of the next section  
 
3. THE INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY 
 
The analysis of traditional growth factors (labor, capital, and technology) needs to be 
completed with the study of the institutional framework where these factors interact. 
As it was explained in the last two sections, the introduction of market institutions and 
political stability in the 19th century promoted economic growth in the second half of 
the century, though with a relative backwardness. The protectionism and intense 
public regulations implemented at the end of the 19th century and extremely 
intensified in the two first decades of the Franco dictatorship, reduced the Spanish 
growth. Since 1959, the progressive reduction of those bad policies, the introduction 
of a stable democracy, and the integration in the European Union and in the global 
markets, have allowed an intense economic growth and convergence process.  
 
Structural changes that the Spanish economy has had during its growth process are 
also related with the institutional framework. Thus, there have been four main 
structural changes: openness, change in productive structure, increase of public 
sector, and equality of income distribution. We have analyzed deeply the openness 
of the Spanish economy as one key factor that allowed the introduction of more 
competition in the domestic markets, the assimilation of new technology, and the 
increase of Spanish competitiveness. The second structural change includes the 
industrialization process in the 1950’s and 1960’s, which lowered the weight of the 
agricultural sector in terms of employment and product. This evolution increased 
productivity due to the capitalization of production. Since the crisis of the 1970’s, the 
industrial sector has lost importance in favor of the service sector, which has 
developed tourist and construction sectors since the 1960’s, and recently other high 
technological sectors like telecommunications or financial services. The arrival of 
immigrants in the 1990’s has developed other sectors like construction or modern 
agricultural production. The third structural change is the role of public sector. Franco 
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regime promoted a high intense regulation and intervention of public sector but, at 
the same time, government budget was very low compared to other developed 
countries. The tax level was very low and the public expenditures were also lower. 
With the arrival of democracy, Spanish citizens could demand higher public goods 
related to their income level. Some of these expenditures have stimulated private 
sector productivity, increasing capital accumulation, economic infrastructures 
(transports, communications, energy, research and development) and social 
infrastructures (education and health). But the public action has also affected the 
fourth structural change, income distribution, mainly through pensions and 
unemployment benefits. These last government policies, though they have partially 
reduced economic growth, are part of the citizens’ public consumption demand. 
 
In the rest of the section we will focus on the current situation of the Spanish 
economy and its institutional framework. As a mature economy, Spain has lower 
economic growth rates and this growth depends more on technological progress (or 
TFP), due to diminishing returns on capital accumulation. Technological progress has 
also reduced its growth rates, because it is getting more and more difficult to 
generate new ideas. But in Spain this evolution is worst that in the rest of the 
advanced countries: in the period 1990-2004, labor productivity growth 0.6% per year 
in Spain while in the European Union (UE15) was 1.4%, and TFP during the same 
period did not growth in Spain while in UE15 was 0.8% per year (Inklaar and Timmer, 
2008). Explanations of Spanish productivity divergence are often given in terms of 
Spain’s delay in adopting new information and communication technologies. But new 
techniques availability has been similar for all western European countries and the 
question is why they are adopted in Spain in a lesser extent than in the rest of 
Europe. Though differences in human capital are relevant, the presence of different 
set of incentives could be a major cause, incentives that could be affecting human 
capital formation as well. Bad institutions are a fundamental cause for poor economic 
performance in developing countries, but institutional quality may also be quite 
relevant for productivity, and productivity convergence, in developed economies 
through the type of incentives institutions promote (Sebastián and Serrano, 2009). 
 
In last years, some international institutes have developed different methods to 
measure countries’ institutional quality. We can highlight three of them which produce 
annual institutional index: the World Economic Forum, the World Bank, and the 
Heritage Foundation. We have already discussed in the first section the “Global 
Competitiveness Report” of the World Economic Forum, which combines economic 
data with institutional measurement, including the Executive Opinion Survey, which 
measures several aspects of the institutional framework as perceived by companies’ 
executives (Schwab, 2009). The World Bank has developed two measures. The first 
is the “Worldwide Governance Indicators”, which includes six dimension on 
governance based on the views of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents: 
voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption (Kaufmann, 
Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2007). The second is the yearly publication “Doing Business” 
which provides a combination of objective data and experts’ opinions for ten different 
aspects constraining business activity: starting a business, dealing with construction 
permits, employing and hiring workers, registering property, getting credit, protecting 
investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts, and closing a 
business (World Bank, 2011). The third institute is the Heritage Foundation with the 
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Wall Street Journal and their “Index of Economic Freedom”, measuring ten 
institutional components: business freedom, trade freedom, fiscal freedom, 
government spending, monetary freedom, investment freedom, financial freedom, 
property rights, freedom from corruption, and labor freedom (Miller and Holmes, 
2011). 
 
All these studies use an index method, ranking each country in different sets of 
institutional indicators. These rankings can be used to compare Spain with the rest of 
the world, especially with developed countries. Sebastián, Serrano, Roca, and Osés 
(2008) have made this exercise, including another sources like the OECD indicators 
for regulation inhibiting competition (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003 and 2005), a 
curious study on diplomatic parking tickets in New York City, whose results may be 
viewed as a proxy of the state of norms of behavior in a broad set of countries 
(Fisman and Miguel, 2006), the World Values Survey5, the European Values Study6, 
and a survey made by these authors to Spanish entrepreneurs about their 
perceptions and valuations of the Spanish institutions7. Their general conclusion is 
that Spain is ranked in a low position and quite far from the most advanced countries.  
 
A detailed analysis of these studies provides the strength and weakness of the 
Spanish institutional framework. Thus, “Doing Business” index shows a worst 
situation of Spain, compared to OECD countries, in five categories. The first one is 
starting a business, which is very costly and it needs longer periods. The second 
one, employing and hiring workers, is related with the bad function of the Spanish 
labor market, reflected in our higher unemployment rate compared to the average 
Europe8; the specific causes are rigidity in employing and hiring workers, and higher 
costs. The next category is getting credit, with a bad situation in credit rights and 
information, use of public register offices, their low cover, and poor legislation in data 
protection. The fourth is the protection of investors, where the low level of firm 
transparency stands out. The last category is closing a business, with very high 
costs. But Spain is well situated in other categories, like registering property or 
enforcing contracts, while in the rest (dealing with construction permits, paying taxes, 
and trading across borders) the Spanish situation is in the average. The general 
perceptions of Spanish businessmen in the “Doing Business” survey confirms that 
lack of transparency in government, poor judicial system working,  labor market’s 
regulations, and shortcomings in education and science, are important barriers for 
business and entrepreneurs.   
  
The Executive Opinion Survey made by the World Economic Forum has the same 
results, or even worse, about the comparison of Spanish institutional situation with 
the rest of developed countries. The Global Competitiveness Report shows that the 
current economic crisis has worsened Spanish competitiveness: in 2010 Spain lost 
nine positions in the world competitive ranking (from 33 to 42), and its situation is 
worse than Malaysia (26), Estonia (33), Oman (34), Poland (39), Cyprus (40) and 
Puerto Rico (41), and only is a little better than other peripheral European countries 
                                                           
5
 http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ 
6
 http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/ 
7
 http://www.calidadinstitucional.org/ 
8
 The Spanish unemployment rate has been double of Europe since 1975: around 10-12 percent in 
growing periods (while in Europe was 5-6 percent), and around 20 percent in crisis periods like 
nowadays (while in Europe is 10 percent). 
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like Slovenia (45), Portugal (46), Lithuania (47), Italy (48), Malta (50), and far from 
Greece (83). The causes of this bad position are the financial problems and, over all, 
the rigidity of the Spanish labor market (position 115 in a total of 139 countries). This 
rigidity produces an extreme high unemployment level and prevents to take 
advantages of the potential good positions in technology adaptation (30), 
infrastructures (14) and education level (31). 
 
A particular survey made to entrepreneurs of three Spanish regions (Madrid, 
Cataluña, and Andalucía) confirms the last results (Sebastián, Serrano, Roca, and 
Osés, 2008). These authors also find a relationship between institutional 
shortcomings and the size of the informal economy, as the difficulties in starting a 
business, getting permits, having a rigid labor market, or enforcing contracts, will 
promote the increase in the informal economy. The fact that some countries, 
including Spain, had an informal economy higher than their correspondent level of 
taxes, would indicate the existence of institutional problems, together with a lower 
level of legal certainty. 
 
The connection between the institutional framework and the entrepreneurs results 
can be completed with a specific study about entrepreneurship in the world, the 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), a research program that assess since 1999 
the national level of entrepreneurial activity (Kelley, Bosma, and Amorós, 2011). The 
annual surveys show the level of entrepreneurships and the perception of 
entrepreneurial activity in each country. This level is not directly related with income 
level, because in poor countries, with less public employments and big firms, 
entrepreneurial opportunities are higher and more used than in richer countries. The 
economic crisis and the higher level of unemployment can also increase the 
opportunities to create an enterprise. But, in spite of these facts, the Spanish 
situation in the GEM studies reflects a worst entrepreneurial situation than the 
average of the innovation-driven economies (GEM uses the three countries division 
of the Global Competitiveness Report). The perceived entrepreneurial opportunities 
are lower than the average, in spite of the higher unemployment rate, though its level 
is similar to southern countries: Nordic countries (Sweden, Finland, Iceland and 
Denmark) have the highest opportunity perception, while economies in Southern 
Europe (Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy) tend toward the low end. But the reverse 
is generally true for perceived entrepreneur capabilities, the Nordic countries, with 
the exception of Iceland, have below average belief about their own capabilities, 
while the Southern European countries, with the exception of Italy, are above 
average on this attitude measure. The third variable measured is the fear of failure or 
the perceived risks of starting a business. The Spanish data reflects a strong 
aversion to risk, which could be possible to reduce with policy changes, like removing 
the large firm employment advantage with respect to health care and pension 
benefits, improving the skills of creditors and investors in assessing higher risk 
ventures, or reducing negative consequences associated with employment protection 
or bankruptcy laws. The relatively high employment protection rate in Spain (in terms 
of procedures and costs required by law to hire or dismiss workers) is the main factor 
behind the fear of failure. The fourth variable is the perception about 
entrepreneurship, in terms of being a good career choice, the amount of status 
society confers on entrepreneurs, or the media attention. Except for the first one 
(being an entrepreneur is not a bad choice), the perception of the entrepreneurs by 
the society is not very positive. The Spanish entrepreneurs associations has pointed 
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out the bad image that media and general public have about entrepreneurs, 
especially when they go bankrupt. To sum up, backwardness in the entrepreneurial 
attitude in Spain is based, not in a genetic or cultural risk aversion, but in problems 
produced by institutional environment against entrepreneurial development. The 
most positive institutional frameworks in Spain, according to GEM surveys, are 
commercial infrastructure, dynamism of the internal market, and physical 
infrastructure, while the most negative conditions are finance, regulations in the 
national policy, and primary and secondary education. These results are similar to 
other international studies already analyzed. The final part of the GEM analysis 
measures the effective entrepreneur activities started in the economy. Bad conditions 
produce bad results, and the new entrepreneur projects in Spain are very low in 
comparative terms. There has been an increase due to economic crisis and high 
unemployment rate, but in 2010 most of the increase was in new companies with no 
employees, meaning that these new firms have been created as a temporal and self-
employment solution for unemployment. 
 
Since the return to democracy in 1977, Spain has had a process of political 
decentralization, in which central government has transferred to regional 
governments most public expenditures (including education and health), some public 
revenues, and a lot of public regulations. Is in these regulations where the regional 
institutions can introduce favorable or harmful institutions. The decentralization 
process could be positive or negative. Its positive effects are related with the regional 
governments’ closeness to their citizens, which allows the introduction of regulations 
well adapted to their situation, and, more important, the institutional competition 
between regions. This competition allows consumers and firms to look for the best 
institutional alternatives, and produce incentives to the regional governments to copy 
the most successful regulations to attract consumers, firms and entrepreneurs by 
supplying the best institutional alternatives. But there are also negative 
consequences of the decentralization process, mainly the break of the Spanish 
market unity. This is an opposite process of the Spanish integration in the European 
Union and its common market with its free movement of goods, services and factors 
of production. The existence of different regional regulations increases the firms’ 
transaction costs (the cost of information and of law performance), introduce barriers 
to entry which reduces competition, reduces the economies of scale (for example 
with the regulations of labeling and product specifications), and makes more difficult 
the free movement of labor (like the regulations of professional services) and capital 
(because of desegregate and unclear regulations). Cabrillo (2009 and 2011) has 
studied the institutional framework of the Spanish regions, using the same 
methodology as the Index of Economic Freedom. The institutional comparison 
between the Spanish regions finds a correlation between economic freedom and 
economic growth: richer regions like Madrid, Baleares, Valencia, Navarra, or País 
Vasco, have higher freedom that poorer regions like Extremadura, Andalucía, or 
Galicia. But the direction of the causality is not clear, and some rich regions like 
Cataluña have a low economic freedom level, which can affect its potential growth. 
 
4. THE EVOLUTION OF COMPETITIVENESS IN THE SPANISH 
REGIONS, CLUSTERS, AND COMPANIES 
 
As pointed out in the first section, the application of the concept of competitiveness is 
more appropriate for regions, districts or companies than for the whole economy. 
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Besides, growth theory assumes that one national integrated market, with perfect 
mobility of factors of production and a common institutional framework, will produce a 
double process, firstly, a convergence in per capita income between regions or 
provinces, and secondly, a divergence in production with the concentration of the 
production process in some regions and clusters (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992; 
Krugman, 1991). In this last section we will study these two elements, firstly the 
performance and convergence of the Spanish regions, and secondly the existence of 
clusters and companies with higher potential to compete abroad. 
 
In the 18th century, due to high transportation and transaction costs, there was little 
interregional trade and regional specialization was scarce. In the course of the 19th 
century, Spanish regions went from a set of relatively independent regional 
economies to a more integrated national economy. This evolution, explained in 
section 2, changed the concentration of the Spanish manufacturing during the 19th 
century. In its first half, transportation and transaction costs decreased, trade among 
regions increased, and regional goods markets became steadily more integrated. At 
this point, manufacturing location varied. These changes in the location of 
manufacturing production arose both from comparative advantage and from 
additional external economies. Increasing returns were highly relevant in the new 
modern manufacturing industries, which produced heterogeneous goods, but 
negligible in traditional industries. Some regions with a large comparative advantage 
in manufacturing because they were well endowed in artisans and capital, such as 
Cataluña, also benefited from gains from external economies. Other northern 
regions, like Asturias and País Vasco, took advantage of the coal, iron and steel 
production. The production structures of agrarian (poor) regions, mainly Andalucía, 
Extremadura and Castilla, did not converge with those of industrialized regions for 
two reasons. First, increasing-returns industries did not move into poor regions. 
Second, agrarian labor did not migrate massively to the new rich regions up to the 
first third of the 20th century (Roses, 2003). 
 
In the 20th century, the process of market integration continued but not with the same 
intensity. The main element in this integration process was the migration exodus from 
the countryside. But concentration of industries and income divergence between 
regions continued during the first half of the century. The interpretation of this fact is 
that, in the long-run, the integration of one national market will produce convergence 
between its regions, but in the short-run divergence could increase in the first steps 
of development with an inverse U-shape evolution similar to that of personal income 
distribution. One of the factors that retarded convergence of Spanish regions was 
protectionism since the end of the 19th century to the last decades of the 20th century. 
As discussed above, protection policies are more related with the political economy 
of pressure groups than with the identification of potential export activities by 
governments. This implies the renounce of competitiveness and, as a consequence, 
reduces the possibilities of developing an export sector on the lines of comparative 
advantage. Besides, theoretical and empirical literature show that in the initial stages 
of development, and so much in economies with a small size of their domestic 
market like Spain, protection determines direction in which resources are allocated, 
especially in manufactures. After the delimitation of industrial concentration in the 
19th century, the protectionism in most of the 20th century maintained this 
concentration and stopped the convergence of income between regions and citizens. 
Thus, the industrial sector in Northern Spain (Asturias, Cantabria, País Vasco), the 
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industrial and textile sector in Cataluña and part of the Mediterranean area, and the 
cereal sector in Castilla, maintained their status through protectionism. Only the 
economic changes in the second half of the century modified this situation. 
 
The main change was the economic openness that started in 1959. This openness 
was a global process that included not only the reduction of protectionism but also 
the introduction of foreign investment and domestic competition. Other structural and 
political changes were the development of the tourist sector, the liberation and free 
movement of domestic capital, after the strong regulation in the first years of the 
Franco regime, and of labor, as the countryside-to-city migration took up again in the 
1950’s after the process stop in the 1930’s and 1940’s. As a consequence, a process 
of regional convergence in productivity and productive structure started and 
continues up to now. The available data, since 1955 to nowadays, shows a long-run 
general tendency for regional per capita income and productivity differentials to 
decrease over time. But the total income did not converge, showing that convergence 
was mainly based in the population migration from poor regions to rich ones. 
Aggregate convergence was also based on the gradual homogenization of regional 
productive structures. Regional converge has been fastest in periods of economic 
growth and lower in crisis, and 1955-1979 was the period of higher convergence, 
while there has been a slowdown since 1979. The explanation of this evolution is the 
reduction of large migratory flows which contributed substantially to regional 
convergence of the 1960’s and early 1970’s. Since 1980, however, the contribution of 
employment to income convergence becomes negative, with poor regions displaying 
below average performance in both participation and employment rates. The role of 
the public sector in this process of convergence in factor intensities has been 
increasingly important. The gradual equalization of schooling level across regions 
has contributed positively to convergence, as well as the infrastructure investment 
effort. But the main policy since the Spanish accession to the EU in 1986 has been 
the regional policy with different funds to help poor regions in employment and 
infrastructures. In the last two decades, most of the Spanish regions have converged 
to the EU-27 average per capita income, and only three Southern regions are below 
the 80 percent of the average Spanish per capita income: Andalucía, Extremadura, 
and Castilla-La Mancha. The entry of 5 million immigrants in the period 1995-2007 
has reinforced the Spanish economic growth and the regional convergence process 
(Cuadrado-Roura, García, and Raymond, 1999; Fuente, 2002; Alcaide, 2003). 
 
Together with this regional convergence, the Spanish economic development has 
produced the emergence of clusters and companies with different success in 
competitiveness. The concept of industrial district was firstly introduced by Alfred 
Marshall (1919 and 1920), as a geographic concentration of 
interconnected businesses, suppliers, and associated institutions in a particular field. 
The concept was revitalized in the 1960’s by the Italian economist Giacomo Becattini, 
who developed a theory of local development where the economic advantage of 
industrial districts analyzed by Marshall (externalities of specialized labor markets, 
subsidiaries industries, and technological spillovers) is combined with the sociological 
characteristics of the local community. Becattini applied this theory to the practical 
case of industrial concentration of small and medium companies in Northern Italy 
(Becattini, Bellandi, Ottati and Sforzi, 2003). Later, in the 1990’s the theory of 
industrial clusters was generalized, assuming clusters with different characteristics, 
not only with small and medium firms, but with leader big firms or with different 
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complementary sectors (Porter, 1990 and 1998; Krugman, 1991; Becattini, 2003). 
The optimal conditions of one cluster could stimulate competitiveness in that sector. 
Thus, the analysis of the Spanish clusters and its historical evolution could be a good 
measure of Spanish competitiveness (Catalán, Miranda, and Ramón-Muñoz, 2011). 
This book presents several comparative analyses of Spanish clusters whose 
conclusions are very relevant to reinforce the interpretation of the evolution of 
Spanish economic growth and competitiveness made in this article. 
 
There is a first group of clusters that developed their activity in the 19th century and 
the first decades of the 20th century, taking advantages of the First Industrial 
Revolution. Most of the clusters come from Cataluña, one of the economic and 
industrial leader region of Spain in that period: the production of cigarette paper 
compares two clusters from Cataluña and Valencia; the exportation of olive oil in 
Catalan provinces; competition between Catalan and Madrilenian publishing sectors; 
the Cava (sparkling wine) sector in Cataluña; and the cork industry established in 
Portugal after competing against a Catalan sector9. This sample of clusters shows 
the importance of the foreign sector to develop local leading activities: the Latin 
American market was the key export area in the cigarette paper, olive oil, and 
publishing sector, while the Cava cluster is an example of a successful international 
competition during all the 20th century against the French Champaign and the Italian 
Spumante. The openness of the Spanish economy in the second half of the 19th 
century influenced the internationalization of some Spanish firms and sectors. Even 
the protectionism established at the end of the century could promote some local 
industries by protecting them from the abroad competition, as the “infant industry” 
argument support, and that was what happened with the Cava sector. However, the 
general negative influence of protectionism in the Spanish economic growth, 
explained before, overcomes the possible benefits in the development of some 
specific sectors. In addition, the intensification of protectionism during the first 
autarkic years of the Franco regime reduced the international competition of some 
clusters. That was the case of the cork industry in Cataluña, which reduced its 
international presence because provisions, inputs, qualities and resource allocations 
became impoverished with the autarky policies, and the Portuguese cork cluster in 
Feira took advantage of this situation. The role of the political policies in the cluster 
development became more important during the 20th century. Thus, in the last 
example, the Salazar regime in Portugal promoted the cork industry with its 
regulation of industrial investment and the reduction of salaries in the area of Feira. 
Competition between Barcelona and Madrid clusters in the publishing sector was 
also affected by some government regulations, like the free-postage privilege 
introduced in 1922, and some public institution to help the sector in their export 
markets. 
 
The second group of clusters were developed in the second part of the Franco 
regime, in a period of intense economic growth after de Stabilization Plan of 1959 
that liberalized the protectionist and intense regulation policies of the previous 
decades. These clusters developed the technological advantages of the Second 
Industrial Revolution, and include political investments in the chemical sector in 
Puertollano and the car sector in two companies, Fasa-Renault in Valladolid and 
                                                           
9
 Of course, this sample of clusters is not completely representative because the weight of Catalan 
companies is too high (two of the three editors of the book are Catalans), though Cataluña was the 
most important industrial and economic Spanish region in that period. 
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Seat in Barcelona, the development of two powerful sectors in Valencia, ceramics 
and shoe industry, the shoe industry in Islas Baleares, and the cross-stich industry in 
Cataluña. The influence of the government policies in the origin and evolution of all 
these clusters shows the important role of the state in the economy in these years. 
Thus, the comparison between two Franco government investment commitments, 
chemical sector in Puertollano and car sector in Valladolid, give opposite conclusions 
about the role of the government in promoting investments. On the one hand, the 
public company developed in Puertollano, Encaso, was one of the worst failures of 
Franco’s policies, a company that wasted a lot of resources without obtaining any 
competitive advantage. On the other hand, Fasa-Renault was a big success that 
continues nowadays as a strategic cluster in Valladolid and as one of the factories 
with higher productive in the Renault group. Some policies benefited this cluster like 
the restriction to car imports with only two groups exempted, Renault and Seat-Fiat, 
and the compulsory use of national components, which benefited the formation of the 
cluster and the increase of subsidiaries industries around Fasa-Renault in Valladolid 
area. The same happened with Seat, a Spanish company which monopolized the car 
industry until the opening of Fasa-Renault in 1965. At the end of the Franco regime, 
the industrial crisis in the 1970’s and the opening and deregulation of the economy 
affected these car industries. The highest threat came from the opening of a General 
Motors factory in Zaragoza with one model, the “Ford Fiesta”, which competed 
against the most popular Seat’s small car of the 1970’s, the “Seat 127”. But Seat 
reacted and created in the 1980’s the most popular, sold and profitable car of this 
company ever, the “Seat Ibiza”. In 1986 the company was bought by Volkswagen, 
which increased the technology and quality of the cars produced by Seat, and its 
capacity to export. Together with this evolution, the company has received public 
subsidies in the 1992 and 2007 crisis. 
 
Less government intervention was used in the clusters of Valencia (ceramics and 
shoe industry), Islas Baleares (shoe industry), and Cataluña (cross-stich industry). 
Although these clusters benefited from protectionism during the Franco regime, free-
trade policy during democracy and the entry in the European Union faced these 
sectors to the international competition. All of them are examples of successful 
adaptation to this new situation, explained by their flexible organization of small firms 
coordinated in the industrial district. In the last years, some leader firms have 
emerged within these clusters, introducing more advanced technology and high 
added value by producing more quality goods for higher income demand. However, 
competition of East countries in recent years, due to tariff reduction in textile and 
shoe products promoted by the World Trade Organization, has affected some of 
these Spanish companies competitiveness. 
 
The third group of modern clusters taking advantage of the Third Industrial 
Revolution or Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), has its two main 
examples in the Mondragon Group in País Vasco and Inditex in Galicia. The 
Mondragon Group is based in electronic technology, human capital (most of their 
workers are graduated, under the influence of the University of Deusto), and public 
policies promoting investments in ICT’s to reconvert the classical industries affected 
by the 1970’s crisis (iron and steel industry). The group started an export orientation 
in the 1990’s, though Spain continues to be its main market. The second cluster is 
Inditex, one of the most successful companies in Spain. Starting in a traditional textile 
sector, in a poor region (Galicia) of a peripheral country like Spain, and without being 
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a first-mover, the entrepreneur of Inditex, Amancio Ortega, has created the number 
one textile company in the world. The expansion of the company, first to Spain in the 
1980’s, and then to the rest of the world in the 1990’s, has been widely studied from 
a management point of view. Its success lays on the use of ICT’s to introduce 
flexibility in the knowledge of consumer demand and the adaptation of supply to that 
demand. 
 
The revision of the clusters studied in the book of Catalán, Miranda, and Ramón-
Muñoz (2011) can be used to draw some conclusions about Spanish 
competitiveness and its evolution. The belated openness of the Spanish economy 
explains that most of the clusters had been based on the production of final 
consumption goods, so their competitive advantage was related to marketing, 
distribution, and product differentiation. The most successful clusters were leaded by 
a big company, though some industrial districts with no leader but more flexibility 
have been able to overcome the economic crisis periods. Anyway, the existence of a 
big company does not mean a lack of flexibility, as it is shown with the example of 
Inditex and its use of ICT’s. The last observation is related with the role of the public 
sector in the support of clusters. The policies based on the development of 
infrastructures, education, technology and institutional framework, clearly contributes 
to increase Spanish competitiveness. But the results are not so good when the 
government tries to influence the development of the company beyond the last 
general framework support. In other words, when the government tries to be an 
entrepreneur instead of establishing the institutional framework that facilitates the 
development of real entrepreneurs, the results are far from optimal. This question 
puts together some variables analyzed in this article around Spanish 
competitiveness, specifically institutions, entrepreneurs, government, and their role in 
the economic growth of nations. 
 
Indeed, in the previous section we have studied the importance of institutions in the 
evolution of the Spanish economic growth and competitiveness. In the last years, 
though Spain has converged with the richest countries, it has some institutional 
problems that reduce its potential future growth. And the entrepreneurship factor is 
affected by this poor institutional environment. Spain has had always entrepreneurs, 
but the problem is their quality, which is closely related with government regulations. 
Protectionism and economic regulation introduced in Spain during the 20th century, 
intensified in the first decades of the Franco regime, promoted an entrepreneur 
whose activities were harmful for society. Entrepreneurs did not opened their 
activities to abroad, because it was very difficult (they needed permits to export and 
to have currency) and because they had a small but secure domestic market 
controlled by anticompetitive regulations. They were not worried to increase the 
quality of their products or to introduce technological or management improvements, 
because competition was reduced in domestic markets. Corruption was high, not 
because entrepreneurs were corrupts themselves, but because the institutional 
framework did incentive corruption. Most of the times, the only option for 
entrepreneurs was to use corruption to avoid regulations and to get the elements 
they need to run their companies: inputs, raw materials, permits to operate, currency. 
Besides, public firms of the “Instituto Nacional de Industria” competed against private 
companies (San Román, 1999). Openness and liberalization of the Spanish economy 
since 1959 has improved and changed entrepreneurship in Spain. Competition 
increased and new foreign companies came to Spain. Spanish entrepreneurs started 
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to worry about increasing the quality of their products, reducing their prices, and 
increasing their competitiveness. The most successful entrepreneurs are now the 
ones that produce better goods and services for the society, not the ones that are 
closer to the government. Social perception about entrepreneurs has changed, and 
now is less critical with entrepreneurs than five decades ago. 
 
But the institutional framework is far from perfect, and the Spanish entrepreneur 
structure reflects those imperfections. As seen in the last section, entrepreneurs’ 
values are lower in comparative terms. And the evolution of clusters in Spain has 
showed the importance of government in firm development. Most of the bigger 
Spanish companies are in sectors close to government, central or local, like 
regulated sectors, companies whose main costumer is government or governmental 
agencies, and businessmen skillful in dealing with government’s officials and taking 
advantage of their knowledge in government regulations and relationships. Thus, the 
bigger Spanish companies, which dominates the stock exchange market and the 
internationalization of Spanish firms process that started in the 1990’s, were these 
kind of companies moving in the neighborhood of government: banks (BBVA, 
Santander), communications (Telefonica), transport (Iberia, Renfe), energy (Gas 
Natural, Iberdrola, Repsol,), or construction and infrastructures (ACS, Dragados, 
FCC, Ferrovial). Few companies, far from government influence, has stand out, with 
a development based on the figure of a Schumpeterian entrepreneur: Inditex (with 
Amancio Ortega) is the exception, and we could include also Sol Meliá with Gabriel 
Escarrer Juliá (hotels), Barceló Hotels & Resorts with Simón Barceló (hotels and 
travel agency), El Corte Inglés with Ramón Areces (wholesale distribution), and 
Mercadona with Joan Roig (food distribution), though the last two companies are 
more concentrated in the local Spanish market. In the last years, some young 
Spanish entrepreneurs have stand up in the web industry. To sum up, the 
modernization of the Spanish economy and the institutional advance has improved 
the Spanish entrepreneurship, though entrepreneurs have never been close to 
become a model of social winner. Shortcoming and lack of transparency in different 
levels of government, bad regulations and low competition in some markets 
contribute to maintain non-competitive entrepreneurs, a situation that is reinforced 
because these entrepreneurs can contribute themselves to block efficient reforms. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The evolution of economic growth theories and competitiveness concept is related 
with the capacity to measure different elements or factors affecting economic growth, 
like total factor productivity, institutions or entrepreneurship. In this article we have 
studied the Spanish economic evolution introducing all these different elements. 
Angus Maddison’ recompilation of national macroeconomic data and recent studies 
of the Spanish historians Leandro Prados de la Escosura and Joan Roses, allow us 
to analyze the Spanish per capita Gross Domestic Product evolution in the 19th and 
20th centuries, as well as the contribution to income growth of physical capital 
accumulation, labor and human capital increase, and efficiency gains or total factor 
productivity. This analysis shows a relationship between income growth and 
institutional changes, economic policies, access to international markets, and 
technological change. Thus, the introduction of market institutions and political 
stability in the 19th century promoted economic growth in the second half of the 
century, though with a relative backwardness. But protectionism and intense public 
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regulations, which started at the end of the 19th century and were extremely 
intensified in the two first decades of the Franco dictatorship, reduced the Spanish 
economic growth. Since 1959, the progressive reduction of those bad policies, the 
introduction of a stable democracy, and the integration in the European Union and in 
the global markets, have promoted an intense economic growth and convergence 
process. 
 
The comparison of the Spanish institutional situation nowadays with the rest of 
developed countries shows, using annual index of the World Economic Forum, the 
World Bank, the Heritage Foundation, and the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, that 
Spain is ranked in a low position and quite far from the most advanced countries. 
Lack of transparency in government, poor working of judicial system, labor market’s 
regulations, and shortcomings in education and science, are important barriers for 
business and entrepreneurs. These problems prevent to take advantages of the 
potential Spanish good positions in technology adaptation, infrastructures and 
education level. The political decentralization process which started with the return to 
democracy in 1977 has been harmful because it is breaking the Spanish market 
unity. Finally, the role of public sector in the support of clusters and entrepreneurs is 
positive when its goals are the general development of infrastructures, education, 
technology and institutional framework. But when the government tries to influence 
the development of the company beyond the last general framework support, the 
results are far from optimal.  
 
Entrepreneurship factor is affected by institutional environment. Openness and 
liberalization of the Spanish economy since 1959 has improved and changed the 
Spanish entrepreneurs. But the institutional framework is far from perfect, and the 
Spanish entrepreneur structure reflects those imperfections. Most of the bigger 
Spanish companies are in sectors close to the government, and few companies far 
from the government influence have stand out with a development based on the 
figure of a Schumpeterian entrepreneur. Economic crises have also detected the 
institutional shortcomings of the Spanish economy. The improvement of the 
institutional problems studied in this article, mainly the labor market rigidities, the 
judicial system, the education system, and the market fragmentation due to political 
decentralization, are the challenges of the Spanish economy to emerge from the 
economic crisis and to increase the future competitiveness and economic growth of 
Spain. 
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